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In 2001, South Africa, as mandated by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), assumed the 
role of mediator in the Zimbabwean 
crisis. By this time what can be argued 
to have been an economic crisis started 
in the late 1990s in Zimbabwe had 
become a serious political crisis. Since 
independence from colonial rule in 
1980, the ruling party in Zimbabwe, 
the Zimbabwe African National 
Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), 
had taken steps in economic and 
political management that were 
seen to be autocratic, economically 
destructive and curbing the freedoms 
of Zimbabweans. 
The land reform programme 
which saw the removal of white 
farmers from the land and handling of 
elections drew criticism from European 
countries, individually and through 
the European Union (EU) and from 
the United States of America (USA). 
Consequently, these countries imposed 
economic sanctions on Zimbabwe. 
The South African mediation role, 
through President Thabo Mbeki, 
ran from 2001 to 2008 when an 
agreement between the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC) and 
ZANU-PF was signed. Throughout this 
period the EU, USA and human rights 
organisations criticised South Africa’s 
mediation efforts, the so-called quiet 
diplomacy, claiming that South Africa 
was protecting ZANU-PF and its ruler 
since 1980, President Robert Mugabe. 
However, it is argued in this article that 
South Africa’s mediation role was in 
line with principle of self-determination 
and sovereignty, multilateralism and 
also the principle of ‘African solutions 
to African problems’.
There is consensus in the literature 
that contextual factors consist of 
variables concerning firstly the dispute, 
secondly the contending parties and 
their relationships, thirdly the mediator, 
and finally the international context. 
 Of these four contextual factors 
the focus of this article will be on 
the mediator and the mediation 
process, involving mainly the strategies 
employed by the mediator and the 
responses of the parties concerned. 
The crisis in Zimbabwe has been 
of keen interest for many scholars, 
for example Chris Alden, Mills Soko, 
Miriam Prys, Jack Spence, Chris 
Landsberg, Adam Habib and Merle 
Lipton. Many of these have aimed 
to demonstrate the lack of capacity 
South Africa has to influence and 
effect change within its region. The 
collapse of the Zimbabwean economy, 
continuous political violence and the 
failure of President Mbeki of South 
Africa to meet the international 
expectations in resolving the crisis, are 
sometimes used as examples to contest 
South Africa’s leadership and regional 
hegemonic role.
The period 2000-2005 saw the most 
dramatic deterioration in Zimbabwe, 
According to the GPA, all parties recognised the centrality of the land 
question as a key driver towards a democratic resolution of the crisis 
in Zimbabwe. It not only contextualised the issue as the Zimbabweans 
perceived it but outlined a set of measures to be put in place in order for 
it to be resolved amicably.  
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with freedom of the press being 
curbed, the imprisonment of political 
opponents, the arrest of trade unionists 
and large scale farm invasions. This 
culminated in a humanitarian crisis 
across the country. The main parties 
in this conflict were ZANU-PF, led 
by Robert Mugabe and the MDC, 
led by Morgan Tsvangirai. ZANU-PF, 
which was the governing party at 
the time, was accused of unleashing 
violence against citizens and especially 
those associated with the MDC. 
The approach by the South African 
government, led by Thabo Mbeki, has 
come to be characterised by many as 
“quiet diplomacy”:
Quiet diplomacy is defined 
as a combination of measures 
that include behind the scene 
engagements, secret negotiations, 
and subtle coaxing. (Dlamini 2001)
The mediation culminated in a 
global political agreement (GPA) which 
was signed in 2008. The main outcomes 
of the GPA were the formation of the 
government of national unity (GNU) 
which included power-sharing between 
ZANU-PF and the MDC in government 
and the drafting of a new constitution 
agreed on by both parties. The GNU 
ran its course between 2008 and 2013 
when new elections were held and 
ZANU-PF was declared the victor. 
During this period a new Zimbabwean 
constitution was drafted and adopted 
before the 2013 elections. The focus 
of this article, however, is the period 
between 2001 and 2008 when Thabo 
Mbeki was the South African President 
and therefore the chief meditator.
Former President Mbeki captures 
this economic crisis, and maps this 
historic context of Zimbabwe since 
independence, as follows1:
Zimbabwe’s independence was 
in 1980. And quite correctly the 
government says that there are 
some urgent matters that we have 
to attend to: education, health, rural 
development. And indeed they spent 
huge resources addressing these 
matters, quite correctly. But the point 
we made there is that they did that 
and didn’t pay sufficient attention 
to the fact that they didn’t have 
enough resources to finance large 
social development programmes at 
that stage. So by 1983, three years 
after independence, Zimbabwe 
already had an external debt which 
they couldn’t manage, because 
they borrowed money to finance 
education and to finance health. And 
they couldn’t pay in the end. So they 
then resorted to local borrowing; 
domestic debt ballooned – hence 
all the money comes into the coffers 
of the state, and you the factory 
owner, you want to borrow money, 
the banks are going to charge you 
10 per cent interest. So we put all 
these things down; we said the 
objectives were very good and very 
important, but they didn’t balance 
this thing. That is the beginning of 
the economic crisis in Zimbabwe 
and nothing to do with corruption 
or mismanagement or something. 
And the international financial 
institutions like the World Bank, they 
were quite happy to continue; they 
could see what was happening, that 
this country was over-borrowing, 
but they were quite happy to lend.
So the economic spending on 
developmental objectives which led 
to the country over-extending its 
debt was a major historical factor in 
the Zimbabwe crisis. Two additional 
challenges that directly led to the 
decline of the Zimbabwe economy 
were firstly the conflict in the Great 
Lakes region and secondly the 
subsequent decoupling of the South 
African and Zimbabwean economies. 
Each of these will be dealt with in turn 
a little later. 
A fourth pivotal component 
informing the historic context of 
the crisis was the content of the 
Lancaster House Agreement. This 
included commitments relating to land 
redistribution. In order to settle the land 
reform question in Zimbabwe (as most 
arable land was owned and occupied 
by white farmers) the United Kingdom 
made certain financial commitments 
that would have seen this issue being 
addressed amicably. The fact that the 
UK government reneged on the terms 
of this agreement would ultimately be 
identified by some as the principal 
source of the crisis that persists in 
Zimbabwe.
There are contending narratives 
concerning the history of the crisis in 
Zimbabwe. One view which is clearly 
dominant among Western countries 
focuses on the human rights abuses, 
political violence and instability in 
that country. In this account emphasis 
is placed on Mugabe the man, who 
is considered to have lost his way 
politically in Zimbabwe. A second 
narrative contests this, viewing these 
issues – including Mugabe’s instability 
– as simply symptomatic of underlying 
causes. The causes underlying the 
symptoms are the focus of this 
predominantly Africanist narrative. 
From this perspective the crisis in 
Zimbabwe is not about the lunacy of 
Mugabe, but on the issue of land and 
land redistribution. As such this story 
involves more characters, and reflects 
deeply on the colonial and imperialist 
past: Britain (and its ally the United 
States) are the chief protagonists. The 
colonial past, Britain’s obligations 
as outlined in the Lancaster House 
Agreement, their reneging on their 
pledges, and their interest together 
with their allies in the Unites States in 
“regime change” as a possible political 
solution to this crisis take centre stage.
The Zimbabwe crisis
This section presents a chronology 
of the events that took place in 
Zimbabwe from 1995 to 2008. 
(See table on the next two pages) It 
focuses in particular on the regional 
response to the growing problems in 
Zimbabwe, and South Africa’s role in 
particular.
According to the GPA, all parties 
recognised the centrality of the land 
question as a key driver towards a 
democratic resolution of the crisis in 
Zimbabwe. It not only contextualised 
the issue as the Zimbabweans 
perceived it but outlined a set of 
measures to be put in place in order 
for it to be resolved amicably.  Another 
key element informing the approach 
to the mediation process was with 
regards the equally important factor 
of a ‘regime change’ agenda of the UK 
and the USA.
The mediation process was 
besmirched with misconceptions 
fuelled by the media in the region 
and abroad. Some of these were the 
statement made by Mbeki that ‘there is 
no crisis’ in Zimbabwe; Mbeki holding 
Mugabe’s hand on occasion in full view 
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TAbLe 1: Key evenTS in ZiMbAbwe
DATE KEY EVENT
1998 An economic crisis marked by high interest rates and inflation provokes riots and massive support 
for the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions headed by Morgan Tsvangirai
August 1998 Zimbabwe sent its troops into the DRC (Great Lakes Conflict). Zimbabwe is chair of SADC organ 
on defence
September 1998 Pledging conference convened by South Africa and involving the UK, IMF and World Bank relating 
to funding to resolve the land issue in Zimbabwe
1998–1999 The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is formed and Tsvangirai is appointed leader
2000 Mugabe gets a taste of electoral defeat when voters back the MDC and turn down a proposed 
constitutional amendment which would have given the president more power
2000 Mugabe's ruling ZANU-PF goes on to win a parliamentary poll amid charges of fraud and vote-
rigging  made by the opposition
2000 Thousands of so-called “independence war veterans”, backed by the government, seize white-
owned farms, saying the land was illegally seized by white settlers
March 2001 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (South Africa) Aziz Pahad has working visit with UK Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth, Brian Wilson, including discussion on Zimbabwe
2001 Zimbabwe government agrees to stop often violent land invasions in exchange for British funds to 
finance land reform. Mugabe later rejects criticism he has ignored the deal.
September 2001 President Mbeki and five other SADC regional Heads of State attended a two-day summit in Harare, 
aimed at resolving the conflict in Zimbabwe2  
September 2001 Abuja Agreement signed by Zimbabwe Foreign Minister Stan Madenge, and in return Britain agrees 
to honour commitment to pay £36 million pounds towards a land reform programme3
2002 Mugabe wins six-year term in election pitting him against Tsvangirai. Observers condemn poll as 
flawed and unfair. Commonwealth suspends Zimbabwe.
2002 South Africa donates R93,5 million through the UN World Food Programme (WFP) to improve food 
security in Zimbabwe. The country furthermore donates R12 million to Zimbabwe to purchase 
vaccine/drugs to curb the spread of foot-and-mouth disease in Zimbabwe and the region.4
March 2002 Commonwealth Chairpersons’ Committee meeting and Commonwealth Observer Group Report 
on the elections in Zimbabwe. A need for reconciliation was identified. Presidents Mbeki and 
Obasanjo (Nigeria) are requested to promote a process of reconciliation between the two main 
political parties, ZANU-PF and the MDC. South Africa also relies on the SADC Ministerial Group 
on Zimbabwe to continue with their work in the context of existing SADC decisions, which in many 
instances coincide with those taken by the Commonwealth.5
November 2002 The Joint Commission for Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Co-operation between 
South Africa and Zimbabwe is revived to strengthen bilateral relations.6
December 2002 SADC restructuring, so that countries are no longer responsible for sectors, and rotating chairs are 
introduced. Zimbabwe is no longer chair of the organ of Politics, Defence and Security (a position 
it had held since 1986).7
December 2002 Emmerson Mnangagwe – Mugabe’s chosen successor appears on stage of ANC national conference 
in Stellenbosch
December 2003 Commonwealth summit in Nigeria. South Africa opposes Zimbabwe’s continued suspension from 
the commonwealth. South Africa is accused of putting a spanner in the works; and it is nevertheless 
decided to continue Zimbabwe’s suspension from the commonwealth indefinitely.8
8-9 December 2003 ZANU-PF and ANC secret talks on an exit plan for Mugabe, but these are revealed by Tsvangirai 
who does not approve of “sanitising ZANU-PF”.9
May 2003 President Mbeki, President Obasanjo, President Muluzi (Malawi) engaged in effort to resolve 
Zimbabwe crisis.10
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DATE Key evenT
2003 The IMF begins steps to expel Zimbabwe from the fund over dues unpaid since 2001. Commonwealth 
agrees at summit in Abuja to continue suspension, leading Mugabe to pull Zimbabwe out of the 
organisation.
July 2003 Bush-Mbeki talks in which Mbeki is identified by Bush as the “point-man”, in touch with the parties 
concerned in Zimbabwe11
January 2004 Bilateral discussions between South Africa and Germany and discussion includes Zimbabwe12
February 2004 The EU renews sanctions against Mugabe and his inner circle
October 2004 The High Court acquits Tsvangirai of plotting to assassinate Mugabe and seize power, a ruling 
condemned by the government
October 2004 Zimbabwe government expels a COSATU delegation that arrives on a fact finding mission13
2005 South Africa shifts approach on Zimbabwe from commonwealth position, to AU/SADC mandate: 
“South Africa continues to engage all the stakeholders in Zimbabwe to find ways and means to assist 
Zimbabweans in their endeavours to find a home-grown solution to their political challenges.”.14
January 2005 Another COSATU delegation sent to meet with Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions is expelled 
from Zimbabwe
April 2005 Zimbabwe celebrates 25 years of independence
31 March 2005 The ruling ZANU-PF wins the March parliamentary election, giving it the majority it needed to 
change the constitution
March 2005 South Africa sends the National Observer Mission to observe Zimbabwe’s sixth parliamentary 
elections. South African observers also participated in the SADC observer elections mission. Both 
election observer teams declared the Zimbabwean parliamentary elections credible and reflective 
of the will of the people of Zimbabwe.15
July 2005 Deputy President Mlambo-Ngcuka (South Africa) met with President Robert Mugabe and his 
Deputy, Ms Joyce Mujuru, as part of ongoing talks between the two countries16
May-July 2005 700 000 people lose their homes or livelihoods after a highly criticised Zimbabwe government blitz 
on urban slums
August 2005 Remaining charges against Tsvangirai for plotting to assassinate Mugabe are dropped
Nov 2005 Two agreements entered into between South Africa and Zimbabwe:
- Memorandum of Understanding concerning the Secondment of the Air Force of Zimbabwe 
Personnel to the South African Department of Defence
- Agreement for the Establishment of a Joint Commission on Defence and Security entered into 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe
April 2006 Zimbabwe's annual inflation rises above 1 000%
March 2007 Tsvangirai badly beaten after he attempts to attend a banned protest rally, spurring international 
condemnation of Mugabe's government
2007 Central bank raises its main lending rate to 800 percent from 650 percent on October 1 to fight 
inflation. The bank says it will launch a new currency soon to try to curtail a thriving foreign 
exchange black-market.17
March 2007 Two-day extraordinary summit in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, in March
2007. The Heads of State and Government of the SADC mandate President Mbeki to spearhead 
the promotion of dialogue among political parties in Zimbabwe.
April 2007 Power sharing talks between MDC and Zanu PF mediated by Mbeki begin
May 2007 South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique agreed on sharing the tourism spin-offs of the 
2010 FIFA World Cup™, through “border free” tourism packages18
September 2008 The signing of the Global Political Agreement by all parties in Zimbabwe.
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of international media; the so-called 
“struggle buddies syndrome”; and the 
long-standing relationship between 
the ANC and ZANU-PF. When asked 
for a response to these issues, Mbeki 
provided an answer to what he called 
these misconceptions: 
No, you see, there were two 
approaches which were possible 
with regard to Zimbabwe. One was 
the approach we took: “Let the 
Zimbabweans resolve this question 
and we’ll facilitate that process.” 
The other approach, which people 
like Tony Blair and others were very 
attached to, was regime change. So 
you have these two things colliding. 
All the criticism of us, that’s all it has 
to do with, people are criticising us 
not for what we did but because 
we opposed regime change. And 
they will find all sorts of things – 
that we’ve got farms in Zimbabwe, 
and this and that, and my wife is a 
relative of Mrs Mugabe – and they 
are cooking up all sorts of stories, 
essentially because we said no to 
regime change, which is what they 
wanted.19 
This reveals that Mbeki’s choices 
were not in fact the dichotomy of 
“quiet diplomacy” versus the apparent 
“megaphone diplomacy” advocated by 
the West. Rather he was considering 
soft power tactics and approaches 
instead of military intervention. With 
the possibility of military intervention 
for regime change in Zimbabwe in 
focus, the question arose whether 
Mbeki’s choice for soft power tactics 
was informed by the failed military 
interventions to enforce a change of 
regime in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
When asked about this, President 
Mbeki said: 
Even before that, I mean, just 
fundamentally, it’s something that 
we would oppose, that you can’t 
have the United Kingdom coming all 
the way down here in order to decide 
who should govern Zimbabwe. It’s 
wrong. You know, the British Chief 
of Staff, Chief of General Staff of 
the British armed forces, around 
2002, that period – Lord Guthrie, 
he has said this publicly – I mean, 
we’ve known it because we had to 
deal with it, but he said it publicly 
that Blair put a lot of pressure 
on him to put together a military 
plan for the physical overthrow of 
Mugabe in Zimbabwe. And he says; 
“I refused because it didn’t make 
sense”. That’s the time when we 
were under a lot of pressure from 
them, the British, Americans and the 
Canadians who were so determined, 
they wanted to base forces in South 
Africa to overthrow the government 
of Zimbabwe, and we said “No; 
never will you do that. No, no, no, 
no”. They said they had already 
appointed people and they will tell 
us when they were moving and they 
will put so and so in his place – and 
we say “No, no, no, this is not going 
to happen”. And they couldn’t do 
it without South Africa. In his book, 
the book that’s just been published, 
Tony Blair says that He says: “I 
wanted to physically overthrow 
Robert Mugabe, but I was stopped 
by the neighbours”. That’s how he 
puts it. The rest is just stories; all the 
things about being great buddies with 
Bob Mugabe from the struggle and 
this and that. It’s because essentially 
these forces wanted to overthrow 
the government of Zimbabwe and 
we stood in their way.20
These were but some of the historic 
factors informing the mediation process 
and why South Africa took the posture 
it did. 
Now that we have been presented 
with a brief yet insightful historic 
perspective, let me outline what my 
concerns are going forward.
My main concern is indeed the end 
game, in particular what will happen to 
a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe.  
I contend that once Mugabe dies, 
the ruling party, ZANU-PF will split 
into three dominant factions, that of 
Grace Mugabe, the Deputy President 
and a third group hoping to provide 
some conciliation between the warring 
two groups above. This split will cause 
a climate of uncertainty, opposition 
parties are going to want to provide 
much needed direction, much to the 
consternation of some in ZANU-PF. 
The economy is going to take a further 
tumble just for good measure.  Protest 
action and social unrest will be the order 
of the day, demanding change now that 
the liberation leader is no more, further 
exacerbating the tension in Harare and 
further afield in Zimbabwe. 
This I contend is when the military 
will step in and ‘save the day’ because 
with such uncertainty, a failing 
economy and violent protest action, 
someone will have to bring calmness 
and stop lawlessness in its tracks.  I 
argue that by so doing the military will 
be satisfying two very critical elements 
for themselves.  On the one hand they 
will be seen as the purveyors of peace, 
law and order (which will at this stage 
be much needed); and on the other 
hand, they will exempt themselves 
from possible criminal prosecution for 
having propped up the Mugabe reign 
of terror for much of the last 20 years. 
It would be a win-win situation for the 
Generals and their lieutenants as well 
as for the police services (who have 
been on a crusade of a reign of terror 
on citizens daily).
The response from the regional 
State structures such as SADC is 
usually nothing short of callous and 
hence I question to what extent the 
South African government is ready 
for the socio-economic and political 
consequences of a post-Mugabe 
Zimbabwe. There will be a further 
influx of illegal immigrants, putting 
further strain on basic services in our 
metros and towns.  
The political activism of both 
Zimbabweans and their South African 
counterparts in civil society structures 
are required now more than ever to 
have more co-ordinated mass actions 
before we reach this post-Mugabe 
period. The international community 
also needs to come to the party in 
regard to humanitarian assistance 
and the lifting of sanctions in order to 
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The rent seeking behaviour of the 
security forces will continue unabated 
if we do not engage with them and find 
solutions, perhaps through training of 
how to better engage with communities 
and facilitate how we can reduce the 
trust deficit amongst all Zimbabweans.
Already just some months ago, 
the military grew impatient and yet 
another intervention was required by 
South Africans to quell the heightened 
tension in that country.
As per the argument around the 
veracity of the ‘regime change’ matter, 
it is reasonable to assume that indeed 
there was such a desire by the UK 
and the USA for such change since 
this was their preferred strategy in 
Iraq and Afghanistan at the very same 
time. I am reminded of one of our 
South African judges stating that the 
current Zimbabwe leaves much to be 
desired, when some want to sing the 
praises of Mbeki. Well, when looking 
at the said countries where regime 
change did take place, looking at them 
in 2017, there is also much left to be 
desired in countries such as Libya, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and the Ivory Coast. In 
fact, I might even go as far as to say 
that the situation is far worse in those 
countries than is the case in modern 
day Zimbabwe.
The lesson we have learned from 
this entire debacle is if you mess 
with one of the most important 
cornerstones of the capitalist system, 
that of private property relations, you 
will be punished severely.  Hoping 
for the western powers to resolve the 
Zimbabwean crisis will bear little fruit. 
We Africans must find solutions for our 
own challenges.
Conclusion
The net result of all these efforts 
by the Mbeki-led intervention saw 
the culmination of the GPA coming 
into being and accepted by all 
parties involved in the crisis. Mbeki’s 
presidential term in government came 
to an end and the logical next step, 
facilitated by the Zuma administration, 
was for a free and fair general election 
date to be set and for the Zimbabwean 
people to go to the polls and cast their 
votes and indicate their preferred 
candidates and party. This election was 
fraudulent and certainly not free and 
fair.
There are clearly contesting 
narratives and interpretations about 
South Africa’s role. The regional 
responses are supportive of its 
engagement and Mbeki’s role within 
it at the time in particular. This runs 
contrary to the domestic media 
response, actions of civil society organs 
in South Africa and interpretations 
from the West. It is too easy to make 
normative statements about the “best” 
possible outcome in the Zimbabwe 
crisis and, thus, about the failure of 
South African regional leadership. 
Interpretation depends on whether this 
is being viewed domestically, regionally 
or internationally and each grouping 
itself is not necessarily internally 
united. It is clear that there are different 
interpretations on the successes of 
quiet diplomacy, with questions raised 
about what could have been the 
outcomes of the alternative approach 
of regime change, which was seriously 
considered as an option by some. The 
failures of these military interventions 
in other parts of the globe heighten 
these concerns about what alternatives 
may have been possible.  
There are at least three distinctive 
regional public goods provided by 
South Africa: solidarity against the 
West and domestic opponents, the 
prevention of political fallout in the 
southern African region, and SADC 
unity. 
Firstly South Africa’s quiet 
diplomacy/ soft power tactics not only 
provided a sense of regional unity and 
security against outsiders but also, and 
probably equally importantly, unity 
against domestic opponents that are 
perceived to be supported by the West. 
Secondly, the approach of South 
Africa has helped to prevent a 
complete breakdown of Zimbabwe 
and the consequences thereof on 
the social and economic systems 
of its neighbours through increased 
illegal immigration. Among the other 
potential negative consequences of a 
more aggressive South African stance 
towards Zimbabwe would have been 
the destabilisation of uneasy racial 
relations. A spread of the Zimbabwean 
crisis would have also threatened to 
bring up unresolved land reform issues 
in some of the neighbouring states. By 
keeping Zimbabwe economically alive 
and keeping Mugabe within the circle 
of the respected SADC leaders, these 
potential side effects have been at least 
temporary forestalled. 
This then leads to the third public 
good and that is SADC unity. 
When considering all the above 
domestic responses it becomes 
clear that even though there were 
contending narratives as to the manner 
in which South Africa pursued its overall 
objectives in this regard, a dominant 
narrative persists in the region. This 
narrative speaks to the fact that 
South Africa, it seems, had very few 
options as to the way in which to 
resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe; it had 
to adhere to the principle of the self 
determination of Africa, especially 
post-colonialism. 
Looking at regional power 
hierarchies also tells us about the 
limitations and constraints of regional 
powers in the developing world in 
particular, as well as their continual 
need to straddle two worlds – the 
regional and the global.
Whether these measures in the 
contemporary setting will suffice – and 
more importantly whether they will 
stand the test if Mugabe should die 
tomorrow – is indeed the question 
that must haunt us all going into the 
immediate future.■
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